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LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW*
Lee Hargrave**
COURT COMPOSITION AND ADMINISTRATION

Although the constitution contains a detailed set of rules for governance of the court system, it is not and cannot be a complete listing
of the regulations necessary to operate the courts. Under basic principles of state constitutional law, the legislative and executive branches have the power to adopt statutes to regulate courts and judges
so long as the statutes adopted do not conflict with the constitution
or with the inherent powers courts possess under the separation of
powers doctrine.1 This principle remains relevant even though the
supreme court and the other courts have been given substantial rulemaking powers, and the basic question becomes whether a statute
contravenes a constitutional provision. For example, the power of the
courts of appeal to establish procedures to allot judges to panels is
granted in article V, section 8(A) without qualification; thus this power
cannot be controlled by the legislature.2 By its terms, the grant relates
to the selection of individual judges for panels and does not allow
the court to determine, free of legislative control, the question of the
size of the hearing panels. In this regard, the constitution merely
states that panels shall be composed of "at least three judges" and,
in one instance, "at least five judges." Thus, there is no constitutional
violation in the legislature setting the size of panels at more than
three and determining when judges of a court of appeal must sit en
banc.
The supreme court, with little discussion, applied this analysis in
Regira v. Falsetta3 and Carrere v. Castano' and held that courts of
Copyright 1982, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
*
This year's Developments is somewhat truncated, in anticipation of publication
later in this volume of an article on Louisiana Constitutional Law. This article will cover
in more detail some matters that normally would be discussed here.
**
Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973
OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA; MANUAL ON STYLE AND DRAFTING, Nov. 8, 1973 at 769; "The
general rule of state constitutional interpretation is: The provisions of a state constitution are limitations on the power of the people exercised through the legislature; what
is not prohibited by the constitution is permitted." See also Hargrave, The JudiciaryArticle of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 37 LA. L. REV. 765, 786 (1977).
2. Of course, the supreme court could use its supervisory power over the courts
of appeal to regulate how the latter exercise their rule-making power.
3. 405 So. 2d 825 (La. 1981).
4. 397 So. 2d 798 (La. 1981).
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appeal could be required by statute to hear appeals of election contests in en banc panels. It may well be unwise to require such en
banc hearings now that the courts of appeal are as large as they are,
especially with regard to election disputes, which normally will be
heard by the supreme court in any event.' But, the constitution does
not prevent such legislation, and the supreme court's position in this
regard is in accordance with the standard approach.
An important question about the composition of courts was avoided
in City of Baton Rouge v. Cooley,' a case in which the court imposed
a dubious standing requirement 7 and refrained from deciding whether
an attorney serving as a judge ad hoc of the Baton Rouge City Court
was properly empowered to exercise such functions. Under the procedure in effect, such ad hoc judge appointments were made by the
judges of the city court, but the same principles discussed below
should apply whether the appointments are made this way or by the
supreme court. The basic fact is that the practice of attorneys serving as ad hoc judges in any court is not allowed by the constitution.
Although not part of the Judiciary Committee proposal, the Constitutional Convention of 1973 adopted a floor amendment that
specified that "all judges shall be elected."8 The only constitutional
exceptions to the principle are that retired judges (who once were
elected) can be assigned to any court' and that persons who are not
judges can be appointed by the supreme court to fill vacancies or
newly established judgeships."0 As the city court ad hoc judge procedure in Cooley meets neither of these exceptions, it follows that
those lawyers who are not elected as judges are without authority
and cannot serve in the ad hoc judge positions.
This result may seem to be bad policy, particularly with respect
to some of the smaller city courts, and it may cause difficulty in case
of illness, vacations, or recusation of a judge. But, the convention was
pursuing other, stronger policies. While it did not eliminate city courts
and the practice of allowing part-time judges in those courts, the convention placed emphasis on the new ideal of parish courts served by
full-time judges. There was also a strong reaction against the practice of gubernatorial appointments being used to fill vacancies in
judgeships, as the political appointee then had the incumbent's advantage in the ensuing election. The decision was made to replace
5. See the concurring opinions by Judges Lottinger and Edwards in the court of
appeal decision. Regira v. Falsetta, 405 So. 2d 850, 858 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
6. 418 So. 2d 1321 (La. 1982).
7. Id., slip op. at 4.
8. LA. CONST. art. V, S 22. See Hargrave, supra note 1, at 815.
9. LA. CONST. art. V, 5 5(A).
10. LA. CONST. art. V, 5 22.
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gubernatorial appointment with selection by the supreme court of a
person who would be unable to run for the office. However, the appointment of ad hoc judges in the city courts grants an advantage
to persons who, in the future, may desire to run for the office. Indeed, past campaigners for city court judgeships in Baton Rouge have
not neglected to mention just such "experience" as a judge.
In anticipation of the impending constitutional and statutory
changes transferring criminal appeals cases from the supreme court
to the courts of appeal, the supreme court appointed the judges of
the courts of appeal to sit with judges of the supreme court in criminal
matters. The plan was to have three courts of appeal judges sit with
four supreme court judges in a number of cases during the months
preceding the transfer to give the lower appellate court judges experience in handling criminal matters, as well as to assist in relieving
the supreme court of its backlog of criminal cases.
This procedure may or may not have been a wise one. It is
unknown whether the experiment will produce advantages to offset
the problem of the precedential value of opinions rendered when the
court was composed of three temporary judges.1 However, it should
not be seriously questioned that the supreme court was acting within
its supervisory powers in making the assignments of court of appeal
judges as it did. The text of article V, section 5 of the constitution
clearly gives the supreme court the power to "assign a sitting or
retired judge to any court." Omitted from the constitutional language
were the limitations of the prior provision," which conditioned such
assignment on there being a vacancy, an ill judge, or a recused judge.
Several attempts to limit the court's power to assign judges were
defeated during the convention debates."
While arguments based on inferences from the structure of the
court system often are valid, in this instance, such arguments must
give way to more explicit text and purpose. This fact is crucial to
constitutional construction and is the problem with Judge Redmann's
dissent in State v. Petterway,4 wherein he argued that a supreme court
composed of four supreme court judges and three judges from the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal was an unconstitutional tribunal. Judge
Redmann's arguments were based on inferences from structure. If
taken literally, his arguments would prohibit the appointment of appellate court judges to the supreme court even in cases of temporary

11. Brief for State in application for rehearing at 6, State v. Reeves, No. 81-KA-0909
(La. March 1, 1982).
12. LA. CONST. art. VII, S 7 (1921, repealed 1974).
13. See Hargrave, supra note 1, at 789.
14. 403 So. 2d 1157, 1161 (La. 1981) (Redmann, J. Pro Tem., dissenting).
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vacancy or recusal, for it is the same unqualified provision that gives
the supreme court the power to make the appointment in all these
cases. Judge Redmann correctly recognized that the supreme court's
power is limited at some point-the supreme court cannot order appellate judges to "cook its collards" or "clean its commodes."'" But,
regardless of what inferences from structure can do in providing the
limits in such instances, the precise issue at hand in Petterway was
the temporary appointment of judges to hear cases, a power granted
by the text of the constitution and supported by the constitutional
convention debates.
6
A most unusual lawsuit, Imbornone v. Early,"
began as an action
by an Orleans City Court judge seeking to enjoin the judges of the
Orleans District Court from taking over one of the city court's courtrooms. After an original hearing, a dissent, and a rehearing, the
unseemly matter was finally resolved through the use of the supreme
court's administrative powers. It was an apt solution to the problem.
As Justice Dennis' dissent to the original opinion indicates, the case
was not to be decided by an analysis of the inherent powers of courts,
a doctrine dealing with relations between the executive and legislative
branches and not with relations between courts. In this latter regard,
the constitution is clear. Article V, section 5 specifies that the
"supreme court has general supervisory jurisdiction over all other
courts." Under this authority, it can make administrative rules relating
to occupancy of court houses and other rules relating to the administration Of the court system. This was the approach taken on rehearing.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFENSES
7

State v. Foy gives an answer, albeit a 4-3 tentative one, to the
lingering question posed in State v. Suire8 as to whether the prohibition stating that local governments cannot "define and provide for
punishment of a felony" 9 means (1) "to limit the power of municipalities
to impose punishment at hard labor" or (2) "to exempt from local
regulation any conduct which the state legislation punishes as a
felony."2 If the first approach is taken, a local conviction and misdemeanor punishment for burglary, as defined in a city code, is proper,
and under double jeopardy provisions, the defendant cannot be tried
afterwards under the state statute for the same conduct, which pro15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
of 1921,
20.

Id. at 1163.
401 So. 2d 953 (La. 1981).
401 So. 2d 948 (La. 1981).
319 So. 2d 347 (La. 1975).
LA. CONST. art. VI, S9(A)(1).Suire was decided under the Louisiana Constitution
which did not contain this prohibition.
319 So. 2d at 351 (Tate, J., concurring).
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vides a penalty of up to 12 years of hard labor.2 The potential for
abuse, and for frustrating the state's criminal law punishment
priorities, is obvious.
Nonetheless, the majority in Foy opted for the first approach, and
under the facts just stated, prohibited a state prosecution for the
burglary after the defendants had been convicted in the Mayor's Court
of Tallulah of burglary, as defined in the town ordinances, and sentenced
to a fine of $100 or 30 days in jail. Justices Marcus, Lemmon, and
Blanche dissented. Justice Lemmon's opinion, in particular, emphasized the possibility of abuse and the policy-related problems in the majority's rule. Justice Dennis concurred with the majority opinion, and
although he admits that the record of the constitutional convention
is sparse on the point, he finds no intent to adopt the more radical
second approach, which is more intrusive on local government powers.
The constitutional convention transcripts are indeed quite sparse
on the purpose of this limitation on local government. But, as pointed
out in an earlier article on the subject, the new provision can be
traced to the Model State Constitution and the Illinois Constitution
and these sources furnish a base for applying the second rationale.2
In light of Foy, there is still room for a legislative cure to the
problem. Since local governments cannot adopt any regulations or exercise any powers denied them by general law,23 the legislature can
validly adopt a general law prohibiting municipalities from making
criminal any conduct which is defined in state law as a felony2 or
it can specify that certain named state offenses preempt the field and
are denied to local government. In this light, perhaps there is a
redeeming feature in State v. Foy; the decision does not adopt a rigid
rule that could be especially intrusive on local government powers
and does allow the legislature to act to preserve the state's interest,
as the legislature perceives that state interest.
DUE PROCESS

-CHANGES

IN LIBERATIVE PRESCRIPTION

5

Last year's Developments contained a discussion of the principle
that allows statutes shortening a period of liberative prescription to
21. See generally Hargrave, The Work of the LouisianaAppellate Courtsfor the 1975-1976
Term-Louisiana ConstitutionalLaw, 37 LA. L. REV. 480, 487 (1977).
22. See id. at 488. See also ILL. CONST. art. VII, S6(a); MODEL ST. CONST. art. VIII S,8.02
(6th ed. rev. 1968).
23. LA. CONST. art. VI, S 7.
24. A recent attempt by the legislature has failed. La. H.B. 661, S 1, 8th Reg. Sess.
(1982). ("[N]o governing authority of a political subdivision shall enact an ordinance defining as an offense conduct that is defined and punishable as a felony under state law.").
25. Hargrave, Developments in the Law, 1980-1981 -Louisiana ConstitutionalLaw, 42.
LA. L. REV. 596, 601 (1982).
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apply to existing causes of action unless that application runs afoul
of the due process guarantee in a given case. Application of the principle involves a factual inquiry that "centers around the notice a person was given of the promulgation of the new statute and how much
time has intervened since its adoption." 6 At the time, it was suggested that the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, in Tilley v. Government Employees Insurance Co.,' was consistent with the general view
in allowing a statute shortening a period of prescription to apply to
an existing claim when there was a period of 11 months after the
effective date of the statute in which to bring the suit. On the other
8
hand, the First Circuit Court of Appeal, in Johnson v. Fournet,"
probably was departing from the general view when it found that a period
of 8 1/2 months from the effective date of the statute was not a
reasonable time in which to bring the suit. Since then, the first circuit has indicated a change in its approach. In Tate v. Rea,1 the court
did not specifically overrule Johnson v. Fournet, but it did allow the
shortened period to apply to a claim when there was a period of 22
months from the effective date of the statute in which to bring the
action. More importantly, the court stated: "While not necessarily
agreeing with the result reached in Tilley based on the facts thereof,
we do agree with the approach taken to resolve the issue. ' If some
rule of thumb were to be developed, perhaps six months from the
effective date of the statute shortening the period of liberative
prescription could be considered a reasonable time in which to bring
the suit. This period is often the grace period allowed in statutes,"
and it ought to be more than adequate for a person attending to the
status of his rights.
VOIR DIRE
Although it is an unusual constitutional provision, the grant of
a right to "full voir dire examination of prospective jurors"32 was
adopted in Louisiana. The provision's purpose was to stop, in the state
courts, the perceived trend in the federal courts circumscribing the

26. Id. at 602.
27. 396 So. 2d 525 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981). Accord Ewing v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 402 So. 2d 779 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
28. 387 So. 2d 1336 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
29. 405 So. 2d 1200 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
30. Id. at 1202.
31. For an example, see 1982 La. Acts, No. 453, S 1, amending LA. CiV. CODE art. 2342;
see also In re Voyles, 417 So. 2d 497 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982) (construing LA. R.S. 9:440,
as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 686, S 1).
32.

LA. CONST. art. 1, S 17.
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defense's traditional latitude in this regard.' Although there is some
flexibility in the determination of whether a defendant had "full" voir
dire, the supreme court tends to apply the guarantee in light of its
legislative history and grants defendants a significant right in this
regard.
In State v. Frith,' the supreme court followed State v. Hayes35
and reversed a conviction because the defense counsel was not allowed
to pursue questions to prospective jurors about how they "felt"
about a defendant who did not take the witness stand in his behalf.
At issue was the importance of "attempting to explore the juror's
attitude towards a defendant"3 that went beyond the factual assertion that a juror was able to apply the law as written. Since so much
of the jury function relates to bringing to a trial the conscience and
perspective of the community from which a defendant comes, 7 questioning about attitudes and general inclinations as to human behavior
and morality is an important part of selecting a jury-an important
part of the normal function of a "full" voir dire examination.
NATURAL RESOURCES

The Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973 spent substantial time discussing the energy crisis and attempted to devise means
of assuring that the state's citizens would have access to the oil and
gas produced in this state."8 Of course, there was very little a state
constitutional convention could do about the problem, and from the
beginning, it was probable that article IX, section 2(B) ultimately would
be in conflict with federal policy and law. Section 2(B), in response
to the statutory distinction between "interstate" and "intrastate" gas,'
attempted to keep producers from committing natural gas to the interstate market without obtaining permission from a state agency,
thus preventing federal price and allocation controls on such gas. After
the federal legislative scheme was changed to include gas that did
not enter the interstate market, by a statute valid under the commerce clause, it was clear that the preemption doctrine would result

33. See Hargrave, The Declarationof Rights of the Louisiana Constitutionof 1974, 35
LA. L. REV. 1, 57 (1974).
34. 412 So. 2d 1000 (La. 1982).
35. 364 So. 2d 923 (La. 1978).
36. 412 So. 2d at 1004.
37. See S. MCCART, TRIAL BY JURY: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE JURY SYSTEM 139-51
(1964).
38. See 9 RECORDS OF THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973: CONVENTION
TRANSCRIPTS, Dec. 18, 1973 at 2920-33 & 3036-41.
39. 15 U.S.C. S 717 (1976).
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in the failure of the Louisiana scheme. In addition, the state's action
was a violation of the dormant commerce clause by preventing willing producers from shipping their product in interstate commerce."
Tenneco Inc. v. Sutton' recognizes these principles and holds that state
constitutional and statutory provisions seeking to keep oil and gas
from entering the interstate market are unconstitutional under both
the preemption doctrine and the dormant commerce clause.

40.
41.

See Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923)
530 F. Supp. 411 (M.D. La. 1981).

